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ABSTRACT
Rising wage inequality within-gender since 1975 has created the illusion of rising wage equality
between genders. In the 1970's, women were relatively equal (to each other) in terms of their
earnings potential, so that nonwage factors may have dominated female labor supply decisions and
nonworking women actually had more earnings potential than working women. By 1990, wages had
become unequal enough that they dominated nonwage factors, so that nonworking women tended
to be the ones with less earnings potential, and the wage gap between workers and nonworkers was
large. Accounting for the growing selection bias using both parametric and semi-parametric versions
of the Roy model, we show how the earning power of the median woman has not caught up to the
earning power of a median man, even while the earning power of the median working woman has.
As an illustration, we give some attention to wives with advanced degrees  ￿ they have high and
stable labor force participation rates  ￿ and show how their measured wages have grown at about
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male wages(eg., Topel, 1994; Juhn and Kim, 1999).
I.  Introduction
Perhaps one of the most dramatic changes in U.S. labor market outcomes over the past thirty
years is the persistent growth, within-gender, in overall earnings inequality (see Levy and Murnane,
1992, and Katz and Autor, 1999, for comprehensive surveys).  Inequality in earnings grew over this
period not only from an increase in the Mincerian returns to education but also due to an increase in
inequality within groups of workers of similar age and education (Katz and Murphy, 1992). As first
pointed out by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) the inequality growth during the 1970s, the 1980s, and
the 1990s, appears to have occurred throughout the earnings distribution as well as over people’s life
cycle (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1995). By the end of the second Millennium, US wage inequality was
higher than it has ever been since WWII.
The measured earnings of women have substantially, although not fully, caught up with the
earnings of men.  This closing gender wage gap is often said to indicate the importance of wages for
bringing women into the labor force (Mincer, 1962; Goldin, 1990), and the status of discrimination and
other nonwage factors in the operation of the labor market (Becker, 1985; Katz and Murphy, 1992).  At
the same time, it has been observed that this increased gender equality has been coincident with growing
earnings inequality within genders, as shown in Figure 1.  The solid line is a familiar measure of gender
equality (e.g., Murphy and Welch, 1999), namely, the median earnings of women working full-time full-
year as a ratio of the median earnings of men working full-time full-year (hereafter ftfy).  The dashed
line is the ratio of the 90
th percentile to the 10
th percentile in the cross-section distribution of men working
full-time full-year.  We see that both were flat until 1977 or so (see also O￿Neill, 1985, on the apparent
constancy of the gender wage gap).  Both rose ￿ most rapidly at first ￿ from the late 1970’s until about
2000.  This has been regarded in the literature as a curious coincidence (Card and DiNardo, 2002, p. 742;
Blau and Kahn, 1997, p. 2),
1 and perhaps indicative of earnings￿ having multiple and largely independent
determinants, but can we still conclude that wages help pull women into the labor force, and that theGender Equality ￿ 2
2Figure 2’s calculations of the advanced degree gender gap are based on 400+ annual CPS
observations of married women working full-time, full-year.
labor market has mitigated gender discrimination over time?  The purpose of our paper is to suggest that
(a) apparent gender equality is a direct consequence of inequality within gender, and (b) the apparent
gender equality is not real in the sense that the average woman￿s earnings potential has not caught up
with that of the average man.
Although more work on this topic is needed, our two results may suggest a third, namely that
much of earnings inequality growth can be understood with a single attribute model.  In such a model,
women would have less earnings potential than men for the same reason that some men have less
earnings potential than others: differences in the one attribute (call it ￿skill￿).  According to our estimates
below, the average married woman in 1975 had 36% less earnings potential than the average married
man, and would fit in the 17th percentile of the 1975 male wage distribution.  That percentile lost 18%
relative to the male average over the period 1975-95, so in the single attribute model women should have
lost the same percentage.  Some of our estimates do suggest that the gender wage gap widened 1975-95,
although it is unclear whether it widened that much.  Nevertheless, the single attribute model performs
much less badly than it appeared when it was thought that inequality moved in opposite directions within
and across genders.
We argue that, as suggested by the Roy (1951) model as applied to the choice between market
and nonmarket work, working women are selected based on their wages, and the gap between the
earnings potential of working and non-working women grows with inequality among women.  As a
consequence, the wage distribution of working women is different than the wage distribution of women,
to a degree which declines with the fraction of women who work.  Hence, a less biased estimate of the
gender gap may be most easily calculated, and shown to close more slowly if at all, using samples of
women for which the propensity to work is high, and stable over time.  Figure 2 displays such an estimate
as the solid line, namely the gender wage gap calculated as the average log wage for married women with
advanced degrees working ftfy, net of the average log wage of ftfy men with advanced degrees.  Work
is very common for this group of women ￿ about 80% of them have some earnings during the year and
about half work ftfy ￿ so we expect earnings inequality to affect less significantly the trend in this
group￿s relative wages.  The solid line shows little growth in the relative earnings of women.  In contrast,
other schooling groups have fewer women working (the 1970 percentage of women working ftfy is
shown in parentheses in the legend), and thereby a greater potential for selection and composition biases,
and show growth in the relative earnings of women much like that shown in Figure 1.
2  Indeed, whileGender Equality ￿ 3
Figure 1  Wage Inequality between and within Genders
selection bias growth may be less important for the advanced degree women, it still may have been
positive; the solid line actually suggests that the earnings potential of women may have fallen over time
relative to men￿s.Gender Equality ￿ 4
Figure 2  The Gender Gap by Schooling
Section II uses the Roy model to show how growing inequality within gender can give the
illusion of a closing gender gap, due to the selection and composition biases involved with measuring
the earnings potential of women.  The Roy model predicts that a group￿s measured wage growth is an
upward biased measure of its earnings potential growth, with the magnitude of the bias declining with
the fraction of group members actually working.  Section II also shows how a number of demographic
groups, including married women, fit this pattern.  Section III uses structural selection models to obtain
numerical estimates of the amount of selection bias growth, and thereby the relative growth of male and
female potential earnings.  Section IV explores alternative interpretations of our Figure 2.  Section V
concludes.Gender Equality ￿ 5
Our data come from a series of 39 consecutive March Current Population Surveys and their
Demographic Supplements (hereafter: March CPS) for survey years 1964 to 2002.  The population
sample (universe) consists of civilian non-institutionalized population of the US living in housing units
and members of the Armed Forces living in civilian housing units on a military base or in housing units
not on a military base. Each record contains information about an individual, the household in which the
individual resides, and the family and the spouse of the individual. In addition to the standard monthly
labor force data, these files contain supplemental data on work experience. This collection provides
information on employment and wages in the preceding calendar year while demographic data refer to
the time of the survey. Thus, the annual work experience data ￿ from the CPS demographic supplement
￿ cover the period of 1963 to 2001.  We construct two data sets. The first file includes all individuals
aged 24 to 54 (hereafter: individual file). The second file includes only husbands and wives.  We restrict
the second file to include only couples in which we observe both partners (1,248,117 couples in 1964
through 2002).
CPS observations are divided by school completion into five sub-groups: (i) high school dropouts
￿ less than twelve grades, (ii) high school graduates (including those graduated by taking the GED
exam), (iii) some college completed, (iv) college graduates with 16 (and 17) years of schooling (BA) and
(v) college graduates with advanced/professional degree (MBA, Ph.D.) or, prior to 1993, persons with
18 or more years of completed schooling.  We measure wages according to total annual earnings deflated
by the US CPI, giving most of our attention to ftfy samples (namely full-time workers who report
working at least 50 weeks of the previous year).
II.  Selection and Composition Biases in the Calculation of Relative Wages
Wages are often interpreted as measures of important economic concepts, such as human capital
or discrimination.  However, one nuisance in the measurement process is the difficulty of measuring
wages for people who are not working.  Labor economics suggests that the people who work are different
from the people who do not work, and statistical theory shows that the wage difference between those
working and those not working increases with the amount of wage inequality.  The purpose of this paper
is to show that, in the context of the rising inequality 1975 until the present, this effect is important and
explains a lot of the cross-group pattern of wage gains over that period.  Perhaps most important is the
real possibility that the measured wage gains of married women relative to married men are consistent
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The Roy (1951) model, as applied to the choice between market and nonmarket work (see also
Gronau, 1974, and Heckman, 1974), illustrates this.  Each person is described by two variables: his or
her (potential) market wage, and his or her reservation wage (a.k.a., his or her productivity in the
nonmarket sector).  A person works in the marketplace if and only if the market wage exceeds the
reservation wage.  Each person’s market and reservation wages are drawn from a joint lognormal
distribution, whose parameters may vary over time and across groups,
where w and r denote log market and reservation wages, respectively, and hats denote medians.  The
workers L are distinguished from the nonworkers by the condition z / w - r > 0, where z is the net gain
from working.  Since wages are unmeasured for nonworkers, the average measured wage is E(w|z>0):
where σz is, roughly speaking, the inverse of the group labor supply elasticity.  λ is the inverse Mill￿s
ratio, and slopes down as a function of L.
ρwz is the correlation between log wages and the (log) net gain from working, which can either
be positive or negative, according to whether workers have higher or lower wages than nonworkers,
respectively.  Just as important, growth in σw should increase ρwz and could even change its sign.
Remember that σw was much lower in the 1970’s, at a time when ρwz was found to be negative for married
women (e.g., Heckman, 1974).  ρwz < 0 is equivalent to σw < ρwrσr, which should be less likely to hold
as σw gets larger.  Indeed, we find that ρwz changes sign for married women in the early 1980’s.
Intuitively, nonwage factors dominated female labor supply decisions in the 1970’s when σw was
relatively small.  By 1990, wages had become unequal enough that they dominated nonwage factors, soGender Equality ￿ 7
3As shown in the second formula (1), an increased labor supply might come from higher
median market wages, lower median reservation wages, or a change in the labor supply elasticity. 
The labor supply elasticity is determined by the amount of inequality in the net gain z from working.
∆E(w|z >0 ) ' ∆ ￿ w % λ(t)ρ(t)∆σ % λ(t&1)∆ρσ(t&1) % ∆λρ(t)σ(t&1) (2)
that nonworking women tended to be the ones with less earnings potential.
Equation (1) decomposes the average measured log wage into four components, two of which
have been emphasized in the gender wage gap literature.  The first and obvious one is the median wage.
For example declining gender discrimination is sometimes said to uniformly increase the potential market
wage of all women, perhaps as modeled by shifting the median wage.  Second is a form of composition
bias emphasized by O￿Neil (1985), Blau and Kahn (1997), and others: when ρwz > 0, labor supply shifts
move relatively low wage people into (or, if the shift is in the direction of less labor supply, out of) the
labor market.
3  The magnitude of this composition bias depends on the Mill￿s ratio, which is higher when
a smaller fraction of the group is in the labor market.  Third is another form of composition bias.  In
general, at least with ρwz > 0, workers are some combination of high market wage and low reservation
wage.  ρwz indicates the relative importance of these.  Fourth, to the extent that workers are selected on
wages, workers have higher wages.  Gronau (1974, pp. 1127-8) and others recognize that the magnitude
of the selection bias decreases with the amount of labor supply L, and increases with the amount of wage
inequality σw.  However, Gronau￿s result has been ignored when considering wage trends since 1975,
namely when σw was growing.
II.A Labor Supply Constant
Henceforth, we refer to equation (1)￿s bias term without subscripts ￿ namely as λρσ ￿ except
when needed for clarity.  The change over time in a group￿s average measured log wage has four
components corresponding to the four biases mentioned above.
where t denotes time and ∆ denotes a change from time t-1 to time t.  For the time period 1975-2000, ∆σ
and ∆ρ are presumably positive, since within-group wage inequality grew during this period, and ρ
increases with σ (see equation (1)).  The sign of ∆λ depends on the particular group, namely whether the
group increased or decreased its labor supply.  Hence we begin by considering two groups whose labor
supply was little changed during the period, namely high school educated men aged 40-49 and highGender Equality ￿ 8
4Over the period shown in the Figure below (1974-78 to 1994-98), the fraction of high school
educated men aged 40-49 working ftfy fell from 0.77 to 0.73 (authors￿ calculation from the CPS). 
The fraction for high school educated men aged 66-70 fell from 0.14 to 0.11.
∆E(w|z >0 ) ' ∆ ￿ w % λ(t&1)[ρ(t)∆σ% ∆ρσ(t&1)] (2)N
school educated men aged 66-70.
4  For them, and any other group whose labor supply constant is
constant because changes in the median reservation wage offset changes in the market wage distribution,
λ(t) = λ(t-1) and equation (2) becomes (2)N.
In the case that workers earn more than nonworkers would (ρ > 0), the square bracket term is positive,
and growing inequality causes measured average log wages to grow more than do median log wages.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the bias is proportional to λ(t-1), which declines with group labor supply
L(t-1), and should be close to zero for groups like men aged 40-49 for whom L is practically one.
We expect gender and schooling to be the more important determinants of the ∆w ￿ term, with age
less important because most work on the age structure has shown fairly little change over time in the
returns to experience.  In order to bring our attention to the bias term, we compare groups of the same
gender and schooling, and for the moment treat the ∆w ￿ as a constant.  In terms of the bias term, the
second term in square brackets could be as large the first.  To see this, notice that inequality as measured
by σ changes by about 0.13 1975-2000, and that ∆σ is multiplied by ρ which may be a lot less than 1,
so that the product is less than 0.13.  The initial level of σ is about 0.6, and is multiplied by ∆ρ, which
from the formula (1) could be as large or larger than 0.1.  Hence 0.1 or 0.15 is a reasonable guess for the
square bracket term.  The group-difference in inverse Mills ratios is 1.19, so we expect, to an order of
magnitude, the group difference in ∆E(w|z>0) to be roughly 0.15.
Figure 3 shows that, empirically, the group difference is 0.15.  The horizontal axis shows L(t-1).
The vertical axis shows ∆E(w|z>0) for the two groups relative to ∆E(w|z>0) = -0.255 for all prime-aged
high school educated men.  The L=1 intercept in Figure 3 is important because λ(L=1) = 0 and equation
(2)N￿s bias term disappears.  Obviously, the selection and composition biases are zero for a group with
100% labor supply.  Since the L=1 intercept is about zero, it appears that most of the measured wage
gains for elderly high school educated men (relative to high school educated men overall) may just be
an illusion, in the sense that they would be observed even if w ￿ were constant.  Perhaps this conclusion
is not particularly surprising or interesting, but the technique of using the L=1 intercept leads to some
novel conclusions for women.Gender Equality ￿ 9
Figure 3  Measured Wage Growth Declines with Labor Supply (Men)
Most groups of married women significantly increased their labor supply in the 1970’s, 1980’s,
and 1990’s, so equation (2)N does not apply.  However, this is much less true for married women with
post-college education: 43% of them worked full-time full-year in the early 1970’s compared with 55%
in the late 1990’s (the same percentage went from 27 to 47 for college grads and from 24 to 45 for high
school grads).  Where should they appear in Figure 3?  ρ is probably smaller, and even negative early
in the period, for women than for men because husbands and wives sort positively, and the husband￿s
wage has a negative wealth effect on wife￿s labor supply.  In the absence of gender-specific determinants
of the ∆w ￿ term, men and women￿s groups with constant labor supply should have the same L=1 intercept,
but the slope of the wage growth-labor supply relation be smaller in absolute value for women.  In fact,
measuring wage growth relative to men with the same schooling, we find that post-college wives would
be located at (0.43,0.06) in Figure 3.  As predicted by the Roy model, their (schooling adjusted) wage
growth is low like that for husbands aged 40-49.Gender Equality ￿ 10
∆E(w|z >0 ) ' ∆ ￿ w % ρ(t)[λ(t)σ(t) & λ(t&1)σ(t&1)] % λ(t&1)∆ρσ(t&1)
. ∆ ￿ w % λ(t&1)∆ρσ(t&1)
(2)O
II.B Labor Supply Varies
Labor supply trends for some groups, especially married women.  For the purposes of using the
formula (2), the various sources of the labor supply trend (which may include σ, see the formula (1) for
L) all matter in the same way, namely as they contribute to changes in the inverse Mills term λ.  Since
married women￿s labor supply is increasing, their inverse Mills term λ is decreasing and equation (2)￿s
∆λ term has the opposite sign as its ∆σ term.  Equation (2)O rewrites equation (2) by combining these
terms:
We measure σ as the standard deviation of log annual earnings among men, and λ by applying the inverse
Mills formula to observed married female labor supply.  The square bracket term turns out to be -0.14,
and is multiplied by ρ(t).  Since the last term is ∆ρ times 0.71, it probably dominates the middle term for
married women, which is our reason for using the approximation shown in the bottom line of equation
(2)O.  In words, measured wage growth for women is biased upward for men and, like the bias for men
aged 40-49 or 66-70, the magnitude of the bias depends on the initial level of labor supply through the
inverse Mills term λ(t-1).  Whether the bias is larger for male or female groups with similar λ(t-1)
depends on the relation between ∆ρ and gender.  As we explain below, we expect ∆ρ to be positive and
much larger for women.
Figure 4 is a female version of Figure 3.  The horizontal axis measures group labor supply 1974-
8.  The vertical axis measures group wage growth relative to men with the same schooling.  Again we
see that the high initial labor supply groups (single women and/or college+ women) have lower wage
growth.  The relation is steeper within marital status than across marital status, which we expect if
growing inequality has a additional wealth effect on wives (through the wages of their husbands).  In any
case, the high labor supply groups in Figure 4 tell us that the gender wage gap may not have closed at
all, or closed at most 0.15, which is much less closing than suggested by the dashed and dash-dot line
in Figure 2.Gender Equality ￿ 11
Figure 4  Measured Wage Growth Declines with Labor Supply
(White Women)
III.  Recalculating Gender Gap Closure with Heckman and Related Selection Models
If we modify equation (1) by allowing median reservation and market wages to be log-linear
functions of demographic characteristics X, it becomes the Heckman (1979) selection model.  Remember
that the Heckman selection model can be interpreted as a least squares regression of log wages on X plus
the inverse Mills ratio λ predicted for the worker based on her demographics; conversely that least
squares regressions of log wages on X suffer from the bias resulting from the omission of the inverse
Mill￿s ratio λ.  Hence, if the relation between demographics and median wages were constant (our
estimates below suggest that it is), then an increase over time in the λσρ term causes the constant term
in the Heckman selection model to increase less (or decrease) more than the constant term in the least
squares model.  We explained above how the change over time in λσρ is qualitatively ambiguous becauseGender Equality ￿ 12
λ falls and σ rises, but the Heckman selection model permits numerical estimates of λσρ.  We display
some estimates in Table 1.  The left part of the Table uses married women from the 1970’s, and the right
part uses married women from the late 1990’s.  On each side, a least squares and Heckman selection
estimates are shown; of course the Heckman specifications have (or can be interpreted as having ￿ see
Heckman 1979) λ as an additional regressor.
Table 1: Women￿s wages over time, with and without selection corrections
1975-79 1995-99 selection
bias growth














































































2 .07 .07 .18 .18
Notes: (1) dependent variable is log weekly wage.  sample is wives aged 25-54 from white households
(2)  there is no constant term, but the schooling dummies sum to a constant
(3)  selection bias growth is the growth over time of the OLS minus Heckit coefficient on the schooling dummy
(4)  standard errors in parentheses
(5)  experience measured as age - years of schooling - 6
(5)  Heckit model estimated in two stages, with the first stage including wife￿s education and experience, husband￿s
education and experience, and the number of children aged 0-6 in the familyGender Equality ￿ 13
The regressions shown in the Table have no constant term per se, although the schooling
dummies sum to one.  Hence the education coefficients estimate the mean (with the normal distribution,
also the median) log wage for a nonteacher with 15 years of experience (experience measured as age
minus schooling minus six).  According to the least squares estimates, ￿some college￿ women￿s median
log wages increased by 0.066 log points.  Since men￿s wages were higher and declining over this period,
this might be interpreted as a closing of the gender gap.  However, the Heckman selection estimates say
that mean log wages actually fell 0.183 log points; there was little or no gender gap closure.  The reason
for the different Heckman estimates is that the inverse Mill￿s ratio coefficient was negative during the
1970’s and positive during the 1990’s.  In words, the bias from not measuring the earning power of
nonworking women has changed over time (for ￿some college,￿ by 0.249 log points), in large part
because wage inequality has grown within gender.
Figure 5 displays time series for wive￿s log wage selection bias.  More specifically, Figure 5 is
a graphical version of Table 1, with nine time periods rather than two: in each time period the Heckit
constant term (for women with some college) is subtracted from the corresponding OLS constant term.
During the 1970’s, the selection bias was negative (i.e., the selection correction was positive); women
out of the labor force had more earnings potential than women in the labor force.  Beginning in the early
1980’s, the selection bias became positive.  Overall, women￿s wage growth is 25-30% less when
corrected for selection.  Figure 5 suggests that all of the gender gap closure shown in Figure 1 is due to
changing selection bias!Gender Equality ￿ 14
Figure 5  Wives￿ log wage selection bias over time
Although using different methods and concerned with wage gaps by race rather than gender, Neal
(2004) has a result analogous to our Figure 5.  More precisely, while we show that the selection bias for
women is greater (and of the opposite sign) in recent decades than in the 1970’s, Neal shows that the
(1990) selection bias is greater (and perhaps of the opposite sign) for black women than for white
women.  Neal finds a (gender-) differential selection bias of 0.1, while we find a (time-) differential
selection bias of as much as 0.3 (see Figure 5).
Although it may be surprising to see how much changing selection bias contributes to measured
gender gap closure, it is not surprising that the sign of the selection bias might have changed over time
as suggested by Figure 5.  For example, married female employment rates have increased somewhat more
among the more educated (Juhn and Kim, 1999, Table 2).  In the early 1970’s, the average education ofGender Equality ￿ 15
5Selection bias growth varies little across schooling groups in all of the specifications we
have tried, so henceforth we display selection bias for the ￿some college￿ group without reference to
those for the other groups.
6The level of the selection bias does depend on specification.  For example, the selection bias
is significantly more negative (less positive) for Table 2’s specification (1) than specification (2).
working wives￿ husbands was essentially the same as that for nonworking wives.  By 1990, the average
education of working wives￿ husbands exceeds that for nonworking wives by about 1 year.  The more
dramatic change in the relative quality of the married female work force is shown by Juhn and Murphy
(1997) and Juhn and Kim (1999), who stratify married women by their husband￿s position in the married
male wage distribution.  In 1970, the employment rate of married women with husbands at the bottom
of the male wage distribution was 0.44, as compared to 0.31 for married women with husbands at the top.
By 1990, the wives￿ employment rate was essentially independent of husband￿s position, for example
0.60 at the bottom and 0.61 at the top.  In other words, female labor force growth seems to have come
disproportionately from skilled women (see also Topel, 1994).
It is well known that the slope coefficients in women￿s wage and labor supply equations are
sensitive to alternative specifications (e.g., Mroz, 1987).  But what about the growth over time in the
selection bias terms?  First, selection bias growth is similar for various schooling groups.
5  The various
entries in Table 1’s last column are selection bias growth for various schooling groups.  In all cases the
selection bias growth is in the range 0.20-0.32, so that all of the measured gender gap closure for these
groups appears to be selection bias growth.  Second, married women selection bias growth is not
sensitive to the reassignment of variables from the regression equation to the selection equation, or vice
versa.  Table 2 displays estimates of selection bias growth for Heckit specifications that differ according
to the independent variables used in the selection and/or regression equations; six of the eight estimates
are in the range 0.21-0.41, with the two extremes as 0.05 and 0.88.
6  Figure 4 does suggest some
specification sensitivity when we include single women because, for example, the selection bias for
married high school graduates appears less when we compare them with single high school grads then
when we compare them with married advanced degree women.  Nevertheless, Figure 4 clearly shows
that wage growth falls significantly with the labor force participation ￿ the only question raised by that
Figure is whether all, or just half, of the measured gender gap closure is selection bias.Gender Equality ￿ 16
7Interestingly, Newey (1999) suggests that 1-L may be more robust to changes in
distributional functional forms than the other specifications.
Table 2: Selection Bias Growth from
Various Specifications of the Regression (R) and Selection (S) Equations
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
number of children 0-6 S S R, S R, S R, S S S S
husband￿s age S R, S R, S R, S S S
husband￿s education S R, S R, S S R, S S
selection bias growth 0.249 0.217 0.876 0.054 0.413 0.222 0.224 0.208
Notes: (1) each column is a different specification of the Heckit model
(2) wife￿s experience and schooling included in all regression and selection equations
(3) samples of married white women from the CPS
(4) selection bias growth is the growth from 1975-79 to 1995-99, for the ￿some college￿ schooling
group, and 15 years of experience
Third, we expect quantitative, but not qualitative, results to be sensitive to wage distribution
functional form.  As discussed above in relation to equation (1), Figure 3, and Figure 4, the selection bias
growth is negligible for groups of women with high and stable labor supply: a qualitative result which
does not rely on the assumed lognormal distribution.  Since we see log wage growth sloping down with
the level of labor supply, we expect the high and stable labor supply groups to tell us the most about
genuine gender gap closure, even if the wage distribution were not lognormal.  Of course, in order to
obtain a quantitative estimate of the selection bias growth, the Heckman two-step procedure uses the
inverse Mills ratio, with derives from normal functional form.  Moffitt (1999) and Newey (1999) have
suggested using, as a robustness check on the distributional functional form, monotone transformations
of the inverse Mills ratio (equivalently, monotone transformations of the predicted probability of
working).  Table 3 uses different transformations predicted probability of working and different
instrumental variables.  Using 1-L as the additional regressor (see the middle column), we find the
selection bias growth to be essentially the same as with the lognormal model (see the first column).
Using both the inverse Mills ratio and 1-L, we find less selection bias growth (see the last column),
although in the same direction.
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Table 3: Selection Bias Growth from
Various Specifications of Distributional Functional Forms
instrumental variables λ(L)1 - L λ(L), 1-L
number of children 0-6 0.265 0.350 0.145
number of children 0-6, husband￿s age,
and husband￿s education
0.249 0.267 0.090
Notes: (1) selection bias growth from 1975-9 to 1995-9, for the ￿some college￿ schooling
group.  The 0.249 estimate is the same estimate as shown in the last column of Table 1
(2)  L denotes the predict probability of working ftfy, and λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio
IV.  Further Indicators of the Composition of Working Wives, Related to Identification at Infinity
Growing inequality within gender likely contributes to the closing of the measured gender gap
because of its effect on the nature of the selection of women into the labor force.  As we point out above,
the direction of the bias seems clear, as on various observable characteristics the female workforce has
improved its composition.  Structural selection models are one way of calculating a numerical gender
gap that is free from selection bias.  In the spirit of Chamberlin￿s (1986) and Heckman￿s (1990)
￿identification at infinity￿ argument, we have also proposed to focus on wage growth for groups of
women with high and stable labor supply, namely the single women and advanced degree wives featured
in our Figures 2 and 4.  However, these estimates may still be biased to the extent that the composition
of groups of women with high and stable labor supply have changed over time relative to their male
comparison group.  Subsection A makes two comparisons for advanced degree wives: working wives
as compared with the general population of advanced degree wives (ie., regardless of labor force status),
and advanced degree wives as compared to the general population of wives with a college diploma or
higher.  Subsection B displays comparisons of married and single women.
IV.A The Composition of Advanced Degree Working Wives
It is well known that husbands and wives sort positively on many characteristics: height, race,
schooling, and (among dual-earner couples) even earnings.  Our strategy here and in subsection B is to
use the earnings of a woman￿s husband as a proxy for her own earning ability.  Figure 6￿s solid line is
the difference between the average log weekly wages of two groups of husbands: husbands of women
who have advanced degrees and the husbands of women who have at least graduated college.  The series
has trends up since 197, which suggests that the group of advanced degree women has grown via theGender Equality ￿ 18
Figure 6  Composition of Advanced Degree Working Wives,
using Husband￿s Earnings as a Proxy
addition of women with relatively high earnings potential.
IV.B Determinants of Marriage Rates
Figure 4 also shows that prime-aged single women as a group: (a) supply more labor, and (b)
have enjoyed less wage growth than married women.  Has single female wage growth been less because
their human capital (as a group) has declined relative to that of married women?  It is well known that
prime-aged single women have become increasingly black, but that is not the explanation of Figure 4
because it uses only samples of white women.  Figure 7 displays the fraction of white women, stratified
by marital status, with a college or advanced degree.  Here we see that human capital has grown for both
groups in the same amount until the early 1990’s.  Since then, the fraction with degrees has grown only
for married women, by about eight percentage points.Gender Equality ￿ 19
Figure 7  Fraction of White Women aged 25-54
with College Degree or Higher
If declining relative human capital of single were to explain the kinds of wage growth shown in
Figure 4, then Figure 7 suggests that it would have occurred since 1990.  More work comparing married
and single women is needed, but for our calculation it appears that much of the relative decline in wages
of single women occurred prior to 1990.
V.  Conclusions
Growing earnings inequality has been associated with the loss in earnings potential for some
groups of people, and the growth in earnings potential of others.  Wives not working in the marketplace
include a disproportionate share of people with lost earnings potential, but are not included in
calculations of female earnings.  Hence, growing earnings inequality within gender has created the
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average man, if she has gained at all.  How large is this bias?  We offer a parametric estimate and two
simple nonparametric estimates, based on the principle that the effects of labor force selection are
minimal among groups with high and stable labor supply.  The first nonparametric estimate is the gender
gap among married people with advanced degrees, which is about 0.25 or 0.30 log points throughout the
years 1963-2000.  This estimate, which implies that the average married women has gained only 0 or
0.05 log points in earnings relative to the average married man, may hide further selection bias growth
and thereby hide an actual opening of the gender gap, because the employment rate of advanced degree
women is still less than 100%.  Our second nonparametric estimate is the gap between the earnings of
single women and the earnings of men with similar education.  The second gap closes, but only about
half as much as the raw gender gap featured in the literature.
Finally, parametric estimates of the Heckit model (assuming lognormal distributions) suggest that
the average married women did not gain, and may have even lost, relative to the average married man.
All together, it appears that the relative earnings progress of women since 1963, if any, has been limited.
Furthermore, we will see standard measures of the gender gap widen in the future, if and when earnings
inequality within genders returns to 1970’s levels.
We use the Roy model to decompose the ￿selection bias￿ into components related to changing
labor supply, growing inequality within gender, and a changing cross-sectional correlation between
wages and the net gain from working.  The first two roughly cancel each other.  However, the correlation
change itself derives at least in part from growing inequality.  Nonwage factors dominated female labor
supply decisions in the 1970’s when wage inequality was relatively small.  By 1990, wages had become
unequal enough that they dominated nonwage factors, so that nonworking women tended to be the ones
with less earnings potential.
Many in the literature (see Moffitt, 1999, for a survey) have concluded that selection bias may
be a relatively minor factor for understanding women￿s wages.  Our Figure 5 shows that this may have
been the case for U.S. cross-sections sampled in the late 1970’s or early 1980’s (remember that the sample
made famous by Mroz, 1987, and subsequent work by Whitney et al, 1990, and others, was from 1975).
However, our Figure 5 suggests that selection bias was significant in the early 1970’s and, in the other
direction, since the mid-1980’s.  At the very least, selection bias makes significant contributions to
measured wage growth for women and other groups with relatively weak attachments to the labor force.
Our estimates suggest that women￿s earnings potential has grown, if at all, far less than
previously estimated.  Does this mean that female labor supply increases should not be attributed to wage
changes, but rather to social forces or technological change in the nonmarket sector (e.g., Goldin andGender Equality ￿ 21
Figure 8  The Prevalence of Teachers by Degree
Katz, 2002; Greenwood et al, 2001)?  Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but we
argue elsewhere (Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2002) that even if the average woman￿s earnings potential
had remained constant, growing wage inequality within gender might have pulled women into the labor
force.  Hence attributing female labor supply to wages versus other factors is still a topic for future
research.
VI.  Appendix: The Occupational Composition of Wives with Advanced Degrees
Figure 8￿s solid line shows how many of the working wives with advanced degrees are teachers.
Might this bias our inference from Figure 2?  On one hand, teachers have had less wage growth than
other college graduates.  On the other hand, teachers earn less than other advanced degree women, and
the prevalence of teacher￿s among working wives with advanced degrees has been declining.  Also,
Figure 8￿s dashed line shows that the teachers are just as prevalent among working wives with college
degrees, so teachers might not bias Figure 2’s advanced degree wage growth estimate relative to that for
college graduates.Gender Equality ￿ 22
8According to the CPS, these six occupations account for about 60% of married prime-aged
nonteachers working full-time full-year with advanced degrees, among both women and men,
throughout the period 1975-present.
Figure 9  The Advanced Degree Gender Gap by Occupation
Figure 9￿s solid line is the same gender gap for advanced degree women as displayed in Figure
2.  The dashed line is the gender gap for nonteachers, which has essentially the same (lack of) trend.
Aside from teaching, the main occupations for advanced degree women have been (in order of
their prevalence) managers, nurses, physicians, professors, scientists, and lawyers.
8  Within these six
occupations, managers gained the most advanced degree married women, but relatively few married men.
The importance and growth of the manager category by itself tends to close the advanced degree gender
gap, because managers earn somewhat more than the average advanced degree wife, and because the
gender gap among managers closed 0.08 log points.  However, closure of 0.08 is much less than we see
in Figure 2 for the other education groups.  Furthermore, the gender gap seems to have widened for some
occupations, such as physicians.  In summary, the gender gaps by occupation have closed too little, andGender Equality ￿ 23
shifts of women toward high wage occupations have been too little, for the overall gender  gap among
persons with advanced degrees to close significantly.
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